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Abstract
This thesis examines the emissions costs of Swedish aviation and their degree of internalisation under current
economic instruments. The results show that the degree of internalisation spans from practically zero for a 
long-haul flight to 6 per cent for a typical domestic flight, where the climate cost, including high-altitude 
impact, makes up the main part of the cost. To inform evaluation of the consequences of this under-
internalisation, or attempts to correct for it using price instruments, the price and income elasticities of 
international leisure air travel from Sweden are estimated using household expenditure data and two different
price measures. The resulting elasticities are very high – 2.03 or 2.04 for the income elasticity and -2.53 or 
-1.88 for the price elasticity – and should be interpreted cautiously due to data limitations, especially for the 
price elasticities. However, even a cautious interpretation seems to support other authors’ findings that 
demand for leisure air travel is price and income elastic. This means that pricing the uninternalised costs 
would have a clear effect on demand and hence on emissions, without undesired distributional effects. The 
thesis concludes with a discussion of how such price instruments could be designed.
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Sammanfattning
I denna uppsats studeras internaliseringsgraden för flygets utsläppskostnader, dvs. i vilken utsträckning 
miljökostnaderna från flygets utsläpp betalas av flygbolagen i stället för att bäras av samhället i stort. Redan 
tidigare studier har pekat på att flyget bara betalar en mindre del, men dessa studier har i allmänhet antingen 
använt gamla kostnadsskattningar för olika utsläpp eller bortsett från stora delar av flygets miljöpåverkan. 
För att bättre kunna bedöma konsekvenserna av om flyget i stället skulle betala sina fulla utsläppskostnader 
har pris- och inkomstelasticiteten, dvs. hur mycket flygresandet påverkas av förändringar i biljettpriser eller 
hushållens inkomster, skattats med hjälp av data om hushållens utgifter i olika inkomstgrupper och två olika 
prismått.
Flygets totala klimatpåverkan, inklusive höghöjdseffekter, är i snitt runt dubbelt så stor som endast 
koldioxidens klimatpåverkan. För andra luftföroreningar står utsläppen på marschhöjd för ungefär 80 procent
av flygets totala bidrag till förtida dödsfall. Dagens ekonomiska styrmedel – EU:s utsläppshandel som bara 
omfattar koldioxid och Swedavias avgasavgift som bara omfattar kväveoxider under start och landning – är 
därför otillräckliga för att prissätta flygets utsläpp. Överskottet på EU:s utsläppsmarknad och det därmed 
mycket låga utsläppspriset förvärrar problemet ytterligare.
När samhällskostnaderna för flygets utsläpp jämförs med flygbolagens kostnader för utsläppen för tre olika 
typflygningar framkommer att klimatkostnaden är internaliserad till 4–5 procent för flygningar inom EU och 
inte alls till destinationer utanför EU där utsläppshandeln inte gäller. För luftkvalitet ligger 
internaliseringsgraden mellan 4 procent för en typisk långresa och 13 procent för en typisk inrikesresa. 
Sammantaget ger detta en internaliseringsgrad på närmare noll för en långflygning och 6 procent inrikes. 
Om flyget skulle beskattas för att täcka de miljökostnader som inte är internaliserade så skulle det utslaget 
per enkelbiljett motsvara 156 kr för en resa Arlanda–Göteborg, 493 kr Arlanda–Madrid och 2 914 kr 
Arlanda–Bangkok. En sådan prisökning skulle ha en dramatisk effekt på efterfrågan åtminstone på längre 
flygningar, och därmed också på utsläppen. Även om brister i dataunderlaget gör att resultatet ska tolkas 
mycket försiktigt så ger elasticitetsskattningen stöd för tidigare studier som visar att hushållens efterfrågan 
på flyg är pris- och inkomstelastisk, dvs. att förändrade biljettpriser eller inkomster påverkar flygresandet 
mer än proportionellt (minskar vid högre biljettpriser och ökar vid högre inkomster). 
Rika hushåll lägger en betydligt större andel av sina totala hushållsutgifter på flygresor, och har i tidigare 
studier dessutom visats vara mer priskänsliga än låginkomsttagare. Argumentet att en flygskatt bara skulle 
slå mot långinkomsttagare medan höginkomsttagare skulle flyga lika mycket som förut kan därför avfärdas.
Hur en flygskatt skulle utformas kräver noggranna juridiska överväganden, eftersom beskattning av 
flygbränsle är förbjuden i EU:s energiskattedirektiv och de flesta bilaterala flygavtal, vilket i praxis även 
kommit att innefatta skattebaser med hög korrelation till bränsleanvändning. De flesta europeiska länder som
idag beskattar flyg gör därför detta genom en avståndsrelaterad passageraskatt. Det framstår i dagsläget som 
den mest framkomliga vägen även för Sverige i väntan på större framgång i det internationella arbetet för att 
flyget ska betala sina miljökostnader – och inte minst som ett sätt att driva på detta.
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1  Introduction
A guiding principle of Swedish transport policy is that taxes and charges motivated by transport policy 
considerations should reflect the marginal social costs of transport (Trafikutskottet, 2006). For aviation, a 
relatively polluting and rapidly growing transport mode, there are reasons to believe that this is not the case. 
For this reason, the Swedish government is considering a tax on aviation (Regeringen, 2014). If such a tax 
were to be implemented, it would be relevant to determine what costs, if any, that are already internalised by 
existing instruments and what costs, if any, that are to be internalised by the aviation tax. Also, the demand 
elasticities for air travel would be relevant when evaluating the environmental effectiveness of such a tax. A 
high price elasticity would imply that taxation would be effective, but if the increase in air travel is instead 
mainly driven by a high income elasticity, taxation would be less effective in curbing the emissions from 
aviation. The aim of this thesis is therefore two-fold: (1) to determine the external costs of emissions from 
Swedish aviation and their degree of internalisation and (2) to estimate the price and income elasticities of 
Swedes’ demand for air travel, more specifically international leisure journeys, to inform evaluation of the 
consequences of this probable under-internalisation and possible corrective taxation. 
Studies on the degree of internalisation of the external costs of aviation are by necessity country-specific just 
like the economic instruments that are part of the evaluation. Most Swedish studies report a very low degree 
of internalisation, e.g. Hansen & Nerhagen (2008). Despite using comparably low unit cost valuations from a
small 2003 study, they estimate the air quality cost for a typical flight Arlanda–Gothenburg to SEK 487,3–
1188,9, which they compare to the emission charge at the time of SEK 356. SIKA (2009) build on the results 
of Hansen & Nerhagen, but add a cost estimation for the CO2 emissions of SEK 8,509 for Arlanda–
Gothenburg. At that time, however, aviation was not yet covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme
(ETS), so there was no pricing instrument to which to compare the climate cost.
Ahlberg (2014) focuses primarily on reviewing cost estimations rather than on matching instruments, 
claiming that the climate cost is internalised by the EU ETS. He concludes that the air quality cost 
estimations currently used in Swedish policy appraisal are probably too low, but that more research is 
needed. According to Ahlberg, the most updated cost estimations are provided in the EU Handbook on the 
external costs of transport by Korzhenevych et al. (2014). The handbook presents recommended 
methodologies and updated cost estimations for different pollutants, while its output values in terms of e.g. 
€/passenger kilometre are highly aggregated and in the case of aviation ignores the high-altitude climate 
impact and cruise emissions of air pollutants.
The most recent Swedish internalisation study by Trafikanalys (2015b) mainly bases its calculation of the 
degree of internalisation of emissions costs on a preliminary version of this thesis, although the calculations 
are slightly changed to harmonise better with the methodology used for other transport modes. Their results 
are thus very close to those of this thesis for the emissions costs, and as for the other social costs of aviation, 
like noise, accidents and infrastructure, these are in aggregate internalised to more or less 100 per cent.
With the exception of Trafikanalys (2015b), previous studies either use dated cost valuations for the relevant 
pollutants (Hansen & Nerhagen, 2008; SIKA, 2009) or fail to reflect the full environmental impact of 
aviation (Ahlberg, 2014; Korzhenevych et al., 2014). Also, Ahlberg without much discussion assumes that 
the climate impact of EU aviation is internalised by the EU ETS, which could be questioned considering the 
present functioning of the market. On the other hand, whereas Trafikanalys (2015b) do not consider the 
climate impact internalised by the emissions trading, they do not discuss the potential complications of using 
complementary internalising instruments for emissions that are already capped by the ETS. This thesis, as 
described below, attempts to fill these gaps by combining updated cost valuations from Korzhenevych et al. 
with a modern scientific understanding of the full environmental impact of aircraft emissions, for domestic 
as well as international flights. Also, both the relevance of the EU ETS in internalising the emissions costs 
and the consequences of complementary measures are discussed.
Regarding the literature on the elasticities of air travel, there is remarkably little research of recent years. 
Older studies are not necessarily valid today, since elasticities can change over the years. Graham (2000) 
concludes that the income elasticity for UK leisure air travel has decreased since the 1970s, arguing that the 
market is becoming more mature. Based on consumer spending on holiday trips, she finds an income 
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elasticity of 1.30 and 1.28, respectively, for 1970-1998 and 1984-1998, or 2.23 and 1.89, respectively, when 
only considering international air travel.
Although most empirical research has used cross-sectional data, most notably a sample of city-pair data (e.g. 
Grosche et al., 2007), panel data estimations have recently become more common, typically for studies of 
inbound tourism such as air travel to the Canary Islands (Garín-Muñoz, 2006), the Balearic Islands (Garín-
Muñoz & Montero-Martín, 2007) or Hawaii (Nelson et al., 2011). Still, recent estimations of domestic and 
outbound air travel typically rely on time series data on aggregate quantity of air travel, average airfares and 
aggregate income (e.g. Njegovan, 2006; Chi & Baek, 2012; Kopsch, 2012a). Njegovan reports a price 
elasticity of outbound UK leisure air travel of -0.7 and an income elasticity of 1.5 using a demand system 
including expenditure on non-fare components of travel abroad and expenditure on domestic leisure. Chi & 
Baek find price and income elasticities for US domestic and international air travel of -1.56 and 3.74, 
respectively, whereas Kopsch for domestic air travel in Sweden finds a price elasticity of -0.82 in the short 
run and -1.13 in the long run, and an income elasticity of 0.44. 
To see how elasticity estimates differ between studies with different approaches, Brons et al. (2002) and 
Gallet & Doucouliagos (2014) use meta-regression analysis to survey the literature on the price and income 
elasticities, respectively. Brons et al., reporting a mean price elasticity of -1.146, find significant differences 
in that business class travellers are less price sensitive than economy class travellers and that the price 
elasticity is higher in the long run. However, they find no significant effect of distance, arguing that “the 
theoretically predicted decreasing effect on price sensitivity due to a relative lack of substitute modes on 
long-distance flights may prove insufficient to dominate the theoretically predicted increasing effect on price 
sensitivity because long-distance flights demand a larger share of the disposable income than short-distance 
flights” (p 172). 
Gallet & Doucouliagos report an income elasticity 1.186 in their preferred baseline estimate, corresponding 
to static panel data studies of domestic air travel, which increases to 1.546 on international routes. Moreover,
they get significant differences for some aspects of the specification or estimation, such as using dynamic 
models (lower) or times series data (higher), but no significant difference between studies of air travel in 
North America, Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and Europe.
The small number of recent elasticity studies is in itself a motivation for more studies in the field. Moreover, 
the dominance of time series and cross-section specification is troublesome. Brons et al. point out 
disadvantages with both time series and cross-section estimations: cross-section data generally exhibit 
relatively little variation in airfares per unit of distance within a given fare class, which renders accurate 
estimation difficult, and the close correlation between fares and distance implies multicollinearity problems. 
Time series estimates generally suffer even worse multicollinearity, because price and income tend to be 
tightly correlated with a time trend. Moreover, service variables such as schedule frequencies, speed of 
aircraft and density of seating may change even more frequently than prices.
Although Brons et al. do not explicitly mention them, there are certainly other factors besides service 
variables that could change over time, such as prices of all substitutes and complements that cannot possibly 
be fully accounted for in a regression. Failing to account for them implies that the resulting estimates will be 
distorted. 
Panel data offer greater possibilities for accurate estimation, but unfortunately the cited studies of inbound 
tourism using panel data are not directly comparable to the problem at hand when evaluating the 
effectiveness of price instruments on aviation in a certain country. In the latter case the interest is in the effect
on total demand for air travel in terms of passenger kilometres and not so much in whether tourists fly to the 
Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands or another close substitute. Theoretically, cheap destinations could 
experience the peculiar situation that higher income and lower airfares lead to less tourism, if the tourists 
instead choose more expensive destinations. Clearly, it would be erroneous to hence conclude that the 
demand for outbound tourism from a country would also decrease in response to higher income or lower 
airfares.
One type of panel data estimation that is rarely, if ever, encountered in the air travel demand literature is 
household expenditure data for different income groups. By comparing the share of air travel expenditure of 
total household expenditure, the income (or rather expenditure) elasticity can more reliably be estimated, 
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because the variation between income groups can be isolated when factors that vary between years or 
countries do not interfere. The price elasticity is then a residual, which may still reflect other changes in the 
economy and will so suffer from the same problems as other time series estimation. Also, using household 
expenditure data implies that only leisure travel can be studied, but since this makes up 74 per cent of 
Swedish air travel with overnight stay – 47 per cent of domestic passengers and 81 per cent of Swedes flying
abroad (Tillväxtverket, 2013, own calculations) – this will still capture the majority of Swedish air travel. 
Therefore, in order to overcome some of the weaknesses of previous studies, this is the approach to be used 
in this thesis, as described further below.
The methodology of the first part of the thesis, determining the degree of internalisation of emissions costs, 
has three components: (1) determining the emissions costs, which in turn requires evaluating the 
environmental impact of the emissions and then valuing those impacts in economic terms, (2) determining 
what economic instruments are to be considered internalising and (3) comparing the costs to the internalising
instruments. The first part consists of a review of the literature on the climate and air quality impact of 
aviation combined with estimations of climate and air quality costs provided in the handbook by 
Korzhenevych et al. (2014). The second part describes taxes, charges and the EU ETS, including a 
discussion of why the ETS cannot be said to fully internalise the carbon dioxide cost of EU aviation. In the 
third part, the aircraft emissions reported in the guidebook of EMEP/EEA (2013) are valued at the costs, 
adjusted for high-altitude effects, found in the first part, and compared to the economic instruments from the 
second part. Since the degree of internalisation calculated this way will vary between different aircraft, 
distances etc., three typical flights – one domestic, one intra-EU and one extra-EU – are used as illustrative 
examples.
The estimation of the price and income elasticities is based on household expenditure data from Statistics 
Sweden (SCB). Data on the total household expenditure (a proxy for lifetime income) and the expenditure on
international air travel (proxied by the category “travel abroad, part paid in Sweden”) are presented for 
different income deciles for the years 2003-2008 and 2012. Two different airfare measures are used: a price 
index from SCB and a measure based on passenger revenue per passenger kilometre for the largest Swedish 
airline SAS. The expenditure on air travel is then divided by the two price measures, yielding two measures 
of the quantity of air travel. Finally a regression is run of how the quantity of international air travel in 
different deciles is determined by airfares and total household expenditure.
The results show that aviation indeed pays a very low fraction of its emissions costs. The climate cost is 
internalised to 4–5 per cent for typical flights within the EU and 0 per cent for flights to destinations outside 
of the EU, where the ETS does not apply. For air quality, the degree of internalisation spans from 4 per cent 
for a typical long-haul flight to 13 per cent for a typical domestic flight. In total then, the degree of 
internalisation of emissions costs spans from practically zero for a long-haul flight to 6 per cent for a 
domestic flight. If the emissions costs currently not paid for by the airlines would be internalised by means of
taxation or other price instruments, the effective tax per passenger for the three typical flights studied would 
be SEK 156 for Arlanda–Gothenburg, SEK 493 for Arlanda–Madrid and SEK 2,914 for Arlanda–Bangkok. 
The price and income elasticities are, depending on which price measure is used, estimated to -1.88 or -2.53 
and 2.03 or 2.04, respectively. However, they should be interpreted cautiously due to data limitations, 
especially for the price elasticity.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Section 2 combines evaluations of the environmental impacts 
of aviation emissions with economic valuations of those impacts to determine the environmental costs of 
aviation emissions. Those costs are then compared to the costs paid by the airlines under the economic 
instruments in use today for three typical flights of different distances. In section 3, the price and income 
elasticities of the demand for international leisure air travel from Sweden are estimated. Section 4 discusses 
the implications of the results from the previous sections for the design of economic instruments for aviation 
and the consequences of those, and section 5 concludes.
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2  The degree of internalisation of the emissions costs of 
Swedish aviation
Determining the degree of internalisation of emissions costs has three parts: (1) determining the emissions 
costs, which in turn requires evaluating the environmental impact of the emissions and then valuing those 
impacts in economic terms, (2) determining what economic instruments are to be considered internalising 
and (3) comparing the costs to the internalising instruments. The first two parts mainly consist of a literature 
review, but some judgements must be made regarding how to value a certain impact and whether a certain 
instrument can be considered internalising before proceeding to the final part. In that part, the degree of 
internalisation is calculated for three typical flights in order to give some sense of the orders of magnitude.
2.1  The external costs of aircraft emissions
Since existing studies tend to ignore high-altitude climate impact and air pollutants emitted during cruise, a 
review of the science of the impacts of aircraft emissions is offered in this sub-section before returning to a 
more familiar economic problem, namely the valuation of these impacts. 
2.1.1  The environmental impact of aircraft emissions
The environmental impacts of aircraft emissions are either global in nature – climate change – or more local 
or regional, causing adverse health effects or contributing to eutrophication, acidification, ozone-induced 
crop losses or other effects on crops or ecosystems. In the following, these will be referred to as climate and 
air quality, respectively.
Emissions from aircraft jet engines include carbon dioxide (CO2), water vapour (H2O), nitrogen oxides 
(NOX), carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur oxides (SOX), unburned hydrocarbons (HC) or volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs), particulate matter (PM), and other trace compounds. CO2 and H2O have no adverse 
health effects, except through climate change, whereas many of the other compounds have been linked to 
adverse health impacts.
Turning first to these health impacts and other aspects of air quality, one of the main problems is NOX. NOX 
includes both NO and NO2 and are involved in the formation of surface ozone and secondary particulate 
matter (PM), which both have negative health effects, especially PM. Aircraft exhaust SOX mainly consists 
of sulphur dioxide (SO2), with trace concentrations of sulphur trioxide (SO3) and gas-phase sulphuric acid 
(H2SO4). Like NOX, SOX is involved in the formation of secondary PM. 
Particles from aircraft combustion are small, less than 2.5 μm in diameter, and are therefore often called 
PM2.5. Although exhaust contains some primary PM, the main PM contribution from aviation is from 
secondary PM in the form of ammonium sulphates, ammonium nitrates and other constituents, originating 
from the emissions of NOX, SO2 and hydrocarbons. This secondary PM will develop over the course of hours
and days, so it will be well removed from the place where it was emitted by the time it contributes to 
increased ambient levels of atmospheric PM concentrations. PM precursors from aviation are not different 
from those emitted from other combustion sources, so they too will contribute to premature mortality and 
morbidity, including cardiovascular and respiratory ailments. For more information and further references on
the health effects of aircraft emissions, see e.g. Mahashabde et al. (2011).
In addition to health effects, aircraft emissions can also affect crops and natural ecosystem (see e.g. Langner 
et al., 2005). Surface ozone formed by NOX emissions can reduce crop yields and acidifying and eutrophying
deposition of oxidised nitrogen can affect agricultural soils and natural ecosystems. Acidification and ozone 
formation are also affected by other emissions, e.g. SOX and VOCs.
Traditionally, only emissions during the landing and take-off (LTO) cycle have been considered relevant 
from an air quality perspective. This can be seen in valuations of the external costs of these emissions (e.g. 
Korzhenevych et al., 2014). Also, the Swedavia emission charge (see sub-section 2.2.1) only considers 
emissions during LTO. For some pollutants, this could perhaps be a reasonable simplification, but Barrett et 
al. (2010) show that this severely underestimates the health effects of other pollutants. Using a recent aircraft
emissions inventory, a global chemistry-transport model, population density and disease statistics, and 
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concentration-response functions derived from epidemiological studies to assess the impact of aircraft 
emissions globally on premature mortality, they estimate that 8,000 premature mortalities per year are ∼
attributable to aircraft cruise emissions globally, representing 80 per cent of the total impact of aviation. ∼
The mortality impacts are to 99 per cent dominated by secondary sulphate-ammonium-nitrate aerosols 
formed though reaction with aircraft-attributable HNO3 and H2SO4, from NOX and SOX, respectively, and 
background NH3. This means that cruise emissions, at least NOX and SOX, should be accounted for when 
estimating damage costs of aircraft emissions. Furthermore, they show that impacts can be displaced from 
flight paths by several thousand kilometres due to meridional and zonal circulation patterns at cruise 
altitudes. The distance and direction of the displacement depends on both latitude and altitude, but typically 
there is a strong eastward displacement and a weaker southward displacement (the majority of the flights 
taking place in the northern hemisphere).
Langner et al. (2005) model the fate and chemical interactions of the NOX emissions in Swedish airspace. 
Although they only consider the part of the flight taking place in Swedish airspace, they show that the 
impacts in terms NOX deposition and increased levels of surface ozone and PM2.5 reach far down through 
Eastern Europe, with Russia, Sweden, Poland and Ukraine being most severely affected. In figure 1, the 
results for PM2.5 are shown; NOX deposition and surface ozone show similar patterns.
Figure 1. Changes in surface PM2.5 concentrations from NOX emissions of aviation in Swedish airspace (Langner et al., 
2005, p 10).
Turning then to the climate impact of aviation, one important factor that determines the impact is flight 
altitude. Commercial aircraft normally fly at an altitude of approximately 9–13 km (Ahlberg, 2014). To a 
great extent, this coincides with the tropopause, i.e. the boundary between the troposphere (the lowest layer 
of the atmosphere) and the stratosphere (the next layer). Its altitude varies between approximately 15 km at 
the equator and 10 km at the poles; in Sweden it averages 12 km. In and around this region, aviation has 
additional high-altitude climate impacts besides the CO2 impact (Karyd, 2015).
Lee et al. (2010) present a thorough review of the non-CO2 climate impact of aviation. This impact is driven 
by long-term impacts from CO2 emissions and shorter-term impacts from non-CO2 emissions and effects, 
which include the emissions of water vapour, particles and nitrogen oxides. Emissions of NOX result in 
production of ozone, which gives a warming effect, and the reduction of ambient methane, which gives a 
cooling effect. Based upon current understanding the overall balance is warming.
In ice-supersaturated air masses in the upper troposphere, aircraft produce persistent contrails which reflect 
solar radiation and trap outgoing terrestrial radiation. These are routinely observed to shear and spread, 
producing additional cloudiness termed contrail-cirrus. The scientific understanding of the formation of 
aviation induced cirrus is lower than for the other climate forcers, but the overall effect of contrails and 
enhanced cloudiness is considered to be a positive forcing and could be substantial, compared to other 
effects. These other effects include, apart from CO2 and NOX described above, the warming effect of water 
vapour and soot aerosols and the cooling effect of sulphate aerosols, but these effects are comparably small.
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When comparing different climate forcers, care must be taken to account for the different time scales of 
different climate forcers. The effects of CO2 on global mean surface temperature last for many hundreds of 
years, while the non-CO2 effects of aviation last for decades. Several metrics have been proposed in order to 
compare the impact of different climate forcers. The one preferred by the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is GWP100, i.e. global warming potential 
with a 100-year time horizon. Using that metric, the total climate impact of aviation (including aviation 
induced cirrus) amounts to 1.9–2.0 times that of CO2 only.
Azar & Johansson (2012) present another set of estimations of the emissions weighting factors for non-CO2 
climate impact. Three are based on physical metrics similar to those used by Lee et al. (2010) and two are 
based on economic metrics, using the climate economy model MiMiC. The economic metrics are Relative 
Damage Cost (RDC), which is the ratio of the climate damage in economic terms from emission of 1 kg of 
greenhouse gas X compared to the climate damage in economic terms of the emission of 1 kg of CO2, and 
Cost-Effective Trade-Off (CETO), which is the ratio of the shadow prices of the emission of 1 kg of 
greenhouse gas X to the shadow price of 1 kg of CO2, under the assumption that a specific climate target 
should be met at the lowest possible cost. 
RDC is based on a cost-benefit approach, estimating the net present value of all costs caused by emitting one
unit of gas X, whereas CETO estimates the cost-effective tax on the emission of gas X required to reach the 
temperature target at the lowest possible cost. If the damages from climate change were considered infinite 
for temperature changes above 2° C and zero for temperature changes below that, Azar & Johansson explain 
that RDC and CETO would be equivalent. Since that is not how the global warming damage function is 
normally modelled, and certainly not in their article, the results differ so that the CETO value is lower 
initially but then rises sharply at the time the temperature is to stabilise. The RDC value is close to the 
GWP100 value – 1.8 compared to 1.7 as a best estimate, with a total range for both metrics of 1.3–2.9. 
These estimates are useful for evaluating the aggregate impact of aviation. However, the authors stress that 
applying the factor to individual flights in a policy situation would result in too blunt a policy instrument, 
since when and where the flights occur have a significant impact on the resulting climate impact. For 
example, a flight may lead to very strong contrail formations and induce cirrus if it flies in a region 
supersaturated with ice whereas another flight flying somewhere else does not, and night and winter flights 
have a stronger warming effect than daytime and summer flights (when there is more incoming radiation to 
reflect, partly balancing the warming effect of trapping outgoing radiation). Moreover, a measure to reduce 
one type of climate impact may increase another: if a plane flies at lower altitudes, it may cause less contrails
at the expense of higher CO2 emissions (due to higher air resistance at lower altitudes).
According to Karyd (2015), a flight altitude of at least 8,000 m is normally required for the formation of 
contrails and contrail-cirrus, and also NOX has a stronger effect at high altitudes. Hardly any Swedish 
domestic flight reaches that altitude, and besides many aircraft for domestic flights are of the turboprop type, 
with a maximum altitude of 7,500 m. For these turboprop aircraft, Karyd recommends that high-altitude 
impact is considered to be zero, but for domestic jet aircraft, he recommends an uplift factor of 1.5 in line 
with the precautionary principle. For international flights, he recommends an uplift factor based on the 
formula 1,5+0,00012d, where d is the flight distance in km. This formula reflects the fact that the longer the 
flight distance, the greater is the portion flown at high altitude, and is calculated so that the total value for a 
very long flight – 10,000 km – corresponds to the upper end of the interval for GPW100 estimated by Azar & 
Johansson (2012).
2.1.2  Valuation of emissions costs
There are numerous studies aimed at valuing the cost of different pollutants, especially CO2. In search for a 
recommended set of methods and default values for the external costs of transport to use when conceiving 
and implementing transport pricing policy and schemes, the European Commission commissioned a study in 
order to summarise the existing scientific and practitioner’s knowledge. This study resulted in a handbook in 
2008, which was subsequently updated by Korzhenevych et al. (2014). The update of the handbook on 
external costs of transport, hereafter “the EU handbook” or simply “the handbook”, is based on a 
comprehensive literature review, aiming to present the state of the art and best practice for external cost 
estimations. This approach makes this EU handbook a suitable source for cost estimations for the following. 
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Starting again with air quality, cost estimations typically follow the Impact Pathway Approach (IPA), as does
the EU handbook. The IPA includes the following steps:
• Quantifying the burden of pollutant emission, e.g. using vehicle emission factors.
• Modelling the dispersion of pollution around its source and its chemical transformation in the 
environment.
• Assessing the exposure, i.e. the population and the ecosystem being exposed to the air pollutant 
emissions. 
• Determining the impacts by applying so-called exposure response functions that relate changes in 
human health and other environmental damages to unit changes in ambient concentrations of 
pollutants.
• Valuing the damages in monetary terms, often based on valuation studies assessing e.g. the 
willingness to pay for reduced health risks. 
For quantifying the burden, the EU handbook uses emission factors from the official EMEP/EEA guidebook 
(EMEP/EEA, 2013). Combining information from EMEP/EEA with the unit costs found in the following 
steps, the air quality costs can be found for a particular aircraft of interest.
For the other steps of the IPA, the EU handbook uses damage costs from the NEEDS project (Preiss & Klotz,
2007). The NEEDS project does not only cover health effects, but also quantifies the side effects of emitted 
NOX and SO2 on materials (e.g. buildings), biodiversity and crops. Estimations of health effects are based on 
willingness-to-pay surveys. Although “it seems natural to let the values for different countries reflect the 
differences in the attitude to risk, income levels etc.”, the handbook argues, “one can also argue that such 
differentiation must be avoided for ethical reasons” (Korzhenevych et al., 2014, p 34). In the end, the 
recommendation is not to differentiate between different countries with respect to willingness to pay. On the 
other hand, differences in average population exposure numbers are accounted for by producing country 
specific estimations of unit costs for the pollutants deemed to be most relevant in the transport sector. These 
pollutants are NOX, SOX/SO2, NMVOC and PM2.5, with unit costs for Sweden of 5.247, 5.389, 0.974 and 
14.578 €/kg, respectively, in 2010 prices.
In principle, climate cost estimation follows the same IPA method as for air quality, only that the dispersion 
and exposure steps are irrelevant. Just as for air quality, emission factors are found in the EMEP/EEA 
guidebook. Unlike air quality, however, where the damage cost approach is used, the EU handbook 
recommends using the avoidance cost approach, i.e. the cost of achieving a given amount of emissions 
reduction, when estimating climate costs. Their argumentation builds on van Essen et al. (2011), who view 
the damage cost approach as the first-best estimation generally to be preferred, but point out two 
complications in the case of climate change:
• Lack of knowledge about the physical impacts caused by global warming. While some effects are 
quite certain and proven by detailed modelling, other possible effects, like more dramatic non-linear 
effects, are often not taken into account due to lack of information on the relationship between global
warming and these effects. It is even more difficult to assess indirect effects such as socially 
contingent damages (e.g. regional conflicts). Even if the probabilities are low or unknown, the 
potential damage could be very high. Since most people are risk-averse, the precautionary principle 
means that these possible impacts should be taken into account. Yet, there are currently no 
methodologies for taking risk-aversion into account under the damage cost approach.
• Equity considerations, especially in connection with irreversibility and uncertainty. Climate change 
involves issues of intra- as well as inter-generational equity. The cost estimations vary considerably 
when changing the discount rate or when using regional weighting in order to reflect differences in 
marginal utility of consumption due to differences in income.
For these reasons, van Essen et al. prefer the avoidance cost approach for estimating CO2 costs. They argue 
that if there are clear reduction targets that represent people’s preferences appropriately, then the marginal 
avoidance cost related to the target could be seen as a correct willingness-to-pay value. And even if the 
targets were not optimal, measures will have to be applied until the target is met. 
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The EU handbook recommends choosing avoidance costs corresponding to stabilising global warming at 
2°C, a target embraced by the UNFCCC and the EU. There is a variety of cost estimations which differ 
substantially depending on the choice of inter-temporal discount rate and fossil fuel price forecast, so the 
handbook bases its cost estimation on a meta-study by Kuik et al. (2009). This is based on a wide range (26 
models) of available estimates of abatement costs and originated from a joint effort of different modellers 
calculating mutually comparable scenarios. Due to the nature of this meta-study, the handbook considers 
their paper a reliable source for average estimates. 
In their paper, Kuik et al. (2009) estimate marginal abatement costs corresponding to different target levels 
for the years 2025 and 2050. These marginal abatement costs can be interpreted as carbon permit prices in an
idealised global emissions trading system where prices are equalised across all sources. For 2°C they find 
€129/t CO2-eq in 2025 (with a range €69–€241) and €225/t CO2-eq in 2050 (€128–€396), measured in 2005 
prices. In the handbook, the 2025 values are discounted back to 2008 using a discount rate of 3 per cent per 
year and converted from 2005 prices to 2010 prices using the Eurozone inflation rate (GDP deflator), 
resulting in a range €48–€168, with a central value €90. 
According to the handbook, their cost estimate matches well enough with some other reviews used as 
guidelines for policy appraisal in UK and Germany, respectively, both reporting a central value of €80. It can
also be compared to the official Swedish “ASEK value” of SEK 1.08/kg (in 2010 prices) which is used in 
project appraisals and based on the Swedish CO2 tax (Trafikverket, 2015). 
As a comparison, the handbook refers to a study by Tol (2012), who reports CO2 damage cost for a statistical
distribution based on 232 published estimates. His mean value is markedly lower – €49 – and varies greatly 
depending on the pure rate of time preference. Tol himself, however, does not seem to favour 
indiscriminately using the damage cost approach. In another article, Tol (2010) cautions that the uncertainty 
of the economic effects of climate change is vast and right-skewed. Intuitively he argues that “it seems that 
negative surprises should be more likely than positive surprises. While it is relatively easy to imagine a 
disaster scenario for climate change – for example, involving massive sea level rise or monsoon failure that 
could even lead to mass migration and violent conflict – it is not at all easy to argue that climate change will 
be a huge boost to economic growth” (Tol, 2010, p 20). “Missing impacts” that are not sufficiently 
understood to be included in damage cost estimations are a reason and for concern and, Tol argues, justify 
greenhouse gas emission reduction beyond that recommended by a cost-benefit analysis under quantified 
risk. The size of the “uncertainty premium”, he further argues, is a political decision. 
If one agrees with Tol above, it is natural to view avoidance cost estimations as a combination of an implicit 
damage cost valuation and a politically decided uncertainty premium. Moreover, using the avoidance cost 
approach instead of the damage cost approach leaves the value judgements relating not only to uncertainty 
but also to intra- and inter-generational equity to politicians, who unlike economists are elected for making 
such judgements. Hence, the following calculations are based on the avoidance cost approach for valuing 
climate impact, using adjusted values from Korzhenevych et al. (2014).
2.2  Current economic instruments for aviation
This sub-section presents the economic instruments for aviation emissions currently in use. As noted earlier, 
existing studies focus mainly on instruments aimed at local pollutants, assuming that the climate impact is 
entirely internalised by the EU ETS. For this reason, this sub-section also includes a discussion of why this 
assumption might not be valid.
2.2.1  The Swedavia emission charge
The major airports in Sweden are run by state-owned Swedavia. At Swedavia’s airports, all aircraft are 
charged an emission charge based on certified emission values of nitrogen oxides (NOX) in the landing and 
take-off (LTO) cycle. The emission values depend on type of aircraft, engine and typical taxi times at each 
airport, where Arlanda is the most expensive and smaller airports are cheaper. Other pollutants and NOX 
emissions during cruise are excluded, as are small aircraft and all aircraft operating at private and municipal 
airports. The level of this charge – SEK 50 per kg of NOX in the LTO cycle – is set so as to cover costs for 
control and measurement of emissions at the airport and mitigating activities (Swedavia, 2014).
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2.2.2  The EU Emissions Trading System
The European emissions trading system is regulated in the EU ETS directive (European Parliament and 
Council, 2003). For the aviation sector, 82 per cent of the allowances are given for free and 15 per cent of the
allowances are allocated by auctioning. The remaining 3 per cent are allocated to a special reserve for later 
distribution to fast growing airlines and new entrants into the market. The free allowances are allocated by a 
benchmarking process which measures the previous activity of each operator in terms of the number of 
passengers and freight that they carry and the total distance travelled. Only aviation’s emissions of CO2 are 
covered, but no non-CO2 climate impact.
Initially, the scope of the system was restricted to heavy energy-using installations in power generation and 
manufacturing industry, but aviation was included in 2012. However, trade between aviation and stationary 
sources is only allowed in one direction: airlines may use permits issued to stationary sources but not vice 
versa. According to Kopsch (2012b), the Commission wanted to give aviation the opportunity to continue to 
grow by purchasing additional permits, but since aviation is not included in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Commission did not want to jeopardise their goals by introducing additional permits for stationary sources. 
In practice, this barrier makes no difference. According to Vespermann & Wald (2011), aviation is considered
a strong net buyer of permits, so the flow of permits goes from stationary sources to aviation anyway.
The inclusion of aviation led to fierce protests from some non-European countries, which disapproved of the 
idea that European and non-European airlines alike would have to buy permits when flying to and from the 
EU. Fearing that the conflict might complicate the ongoing negotiations in the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) concerning a possible future global market-based measure for emissions from 
international aviation (or possibly a trade war), it was decided that only flights within the European 
Economic Area (EEA; EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) were to be included in the scheme (European
Parliament and Council, 2014).
The 2013 assembly of the ICAO (ICAO, 2013) agreed to report back in 2016 with a proposal for a global 
market-based measure scheme capable of being implemented by 2020. If and when such a scheme will 
indeed be implemented remain to be seen, but the exemption for extra-EEA flights will remain in place until 
the end of 2016.
High-altitude impact and extra-EEA flights are clearly not internalised by the EU ETS, but the present state 
of the ETS makes it complicated to judge whether CO2 emissions from intra-EEA flights are internalised or 
not. Some (e.g. Ahlberg, 2014) argue that the CO2 costs of intra-EEA flights are internalised because of the 
ETS, implying that the ambition of the ETS would reflect the true socially desirable emission level. Others 
(e.g. Trafikanalys, 2015b) assume that the socially desirable emission level is set by the quantitative 
reduction targets and argue that since the ETS cannot be expected to deliver the emission reductions needed 
to reach those targets, the allowance price cannot be said to represent the marginal climate cost of aviation. 
If the damage cost approach is used, the question reduces to whether the damage cost happens to coincide 
with the current allowance price of about €7/tonne. Although there are many damage cost estimations and 
one of them may actually end up with a value of €7/tonne, this is clearly lower than the average of €49/tonne
found by Tol (2012) above. Thus, using the damage cost approach, there is no reason to believe that CO2 
emissions are internalised.
If instead using the abatement cost approach, things would be easy if there was one single target, or several 
internally consistent targets. Unfortunately, there is a hierarchy of climate targets of varying ambition. The 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is the ‘‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’’ (UNFCCC, 
1992). In the Cancun agreements of 2010, parties to the convention committed to keep global warming 
below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2010). The EU long-term target is an 80–95 
per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 compared to 1990. This is not consistent with the 
current design of the ETS, where the linear factor at which the cap is to annually decrease only leads to a just
over 70 per cent reduction of the ETS cap by 2050 (European Commission, 2012). 
Not only is the ETS insufficient to reach the EU long-term climate targets if functioning as intended: it is not 
functioning as intended today. The current price of an ETS allowance of around €7/tonne is much lower than 
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what was expected when ETS was introduced and has led to considerable debate about the functioning of the
scheme. In 2012 the European Commission presented a report of the state of the carbon market, stating that a
number of factors including the economic crisis have created a surplus of around 2 billion allowances, 
accounting for the very low allowance price. It concludes:
“The EU ETS has created a functioning market infrastructure and a liquid market producing an 
EU wide carbon price signal. This has contributed to delivering real GHG emissions reductions 
in line with the EU targets for 2020. However, the effects of the crisis compounded by a number
of regulatory provisions related to the transition to Phase 3 have caused serious imbalances to 
emerge between supply and demand in the short term with potentially negative long-term 
repercussions. If not addressed, these imbalances will profoundly affect the ability of the EU 
ETS to meet the ETS target in future phases in a cost-effective manner, when significantly more
demanding domestic emission objectives than today would have to be reached.” (European 
Commission, 2012, p 11)
In a later proposal for a market stability reserve the European Commission (2014b) expects the surplus to 
grow over the coming years to more than 2.6 billion allowances by 2020. That economic actors now take 
investment decisions against the background of an oversupply of allowances in the market and the 
corresponding price signal makes the Commission fear that overall costs relevant for the climate change 
challenge are bound to increase when considered over the mid- and long-term. That is why the Commission 
proposed a market stability reserve which, while not addressing the structural imbalances of the carbon 
market, is supposed smoothen some of the current volatility. The reserve will start operating in 2019 
(European Parliament, 2015). Although the European Commission (2012) has put forward a number of other 
suggestions in order to improve the functioning of the carbon market, the only measure that has been 
implemented so far is the “back-loading”, or postponement, of 900 million allowances from the years 2014–
2016 to the years 2019–2020 (European Commission, 2014a). 
In the light of the review just presented, CO2 emissions are not considered fully internalised by ETS for the 
following calculations. If they were – despite the present imbalances in the market and despite the fact that 
the scheme, even if functioning as originally intended, is insufficient to reach the long-term EU climate 
target – that would imply that any emissions covered by any sort of price instrument, no matter how 
insufficient to reach any targets set, would be fully internalised. Asking whether the instruments are at an 
appropriate level would then be meaningless, because by assumption they would be appropriate at any level. 
Instead, the allowance price is here considered as a partial contribution but by no means a full internalisation.
2.2.3  Taxation
Apart from the EU ETS, there are no other climate-motivated taxes or charges for Swedish aviation. Jet 
kerosene is exempt from the Swedish carbon and energy tax (SFS 1994:1776). Besides, there is no VAT on 
international flights and only 6 per cent on domestic travel, including air travel, compared to the standard 
rate of 25 per cent (SFS 1994:200).
2.3  Internalisation of emissions costs
Having determined the costs and internalising instruments of aviation, these can now be compared to yield 
the degree of internalisation. Since this will differ for different flights depending on distance and, in the case 
of air pollutants, type of aircraft, engine and airport, previous studies often use a typical flight as illustration. 
Here the same domestic flight as in Hansen & Nerhagen (2008) is used, but two additional flights are 
included so that any differences between domestic, intra-EU and extra-EU flights can be discovered. 
2.3.1  Method
First the emissions costs were calculated for the three typical flights. The emissions were taken from the 
guidebook of EMEP/EEA (2013), which includes emissions for a large number of commercial aircraft for 
different distances. Three airports at distances from Stockholm-Arlanda close to those available in the 
database were chosen – Gothenburg, Madrid and Bangkok – but since they do not match perfectly, the 
following calculations apply to the EMEP/EEA distances and the chosen airports should be seen as 
illustrative but not exact examples. The actual flight distances were calculated using great circle distance 
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with an additional correction factor proposed by ICAO (2014).
Then, aircraft that typically operate the chosen routes were selected and information about types of engine 
and number of seats was collected from the airlines. Unfortunately, the EMEP/EEA guidebook does not 
report which engines are used in their calculations, but at least the calculations of the emission charge are 
based on the engines actually used. Typical load factors for short, medium and long hauls respectively were 
taken from the EU handbook (Korzhenevych et al., 2014). The estimated unit costs for the air pollutants 
were also taken from that handbook, but converted from 2010 to 2015 prices using the Eurozone GDP 
deflator. Only the emission values for those pollutants that were evaluated in the handbook – apparently 
those that were deemed most relevant – were taken from the EMEP/EEA guidebook. However, the 
EMEP/EEA shows values for total hydrocarbons, i.e. including methane, instead of the non-methane volatile 
organic compounds (NMVOC) valued in the EU handbook. NMVOC values were instead found in the IPCC 
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 2006).
For CO2, the 2025 unit costs from sub-section 2.1.2 were instead discounted back to 2015, using the same 
3 per cent discount rate, and converted to 2015 prices using the same Eurozone GDP deflator. The central 
value was then €109, with a range of €58–€203. The wide range highlights the sensitivity of the following 
calculations to the assumed unit cost of carbon. Therefore, the calculations were repeated using the lower and
upper end of the cost range as a sensitivity analysis.
The EMEP/EEA emission values are divided into different flight phases, which were grouped into LTO (taxi 
out, take off, climb out, approach landing and taxi in) and cruise (climb, cruise and descent above 3,000 ft, 
i.e. 914 m). In this way, different unit costs could be applied for different flight phases. For CO2, the unit 
value of € 109/tonne was applied for LTO emissions, whereas the uplift factor of 1.5 for domestic and 
1.5+0,00012*distance for international flights from sub-section 2.1.1 was applied for cruise emissions 
(although strictly speaking the uplift factor does not represent carbon dioxide but other climate impact). For 
the other pollutants, all were valued at the unit costs for Sweden in the LTO phase. In the cruise phase, NOX 
and SOX were valued at the same costs as in the LTO phase, whereas the costs of the other pollutants were 
assumed to be zero during cruise.
Using the unit costs for Sweden could definitely be questioned for the international flights. Even if one for 
ethical reasons follows the recommendation from Korzhenevych et al. (2014) not to differentiate between 
different countries with respect to willingness to pay, at least differences in average population exposure 
numbers should preferably be taken into account. The reason this is not done is purely practical: determining 
the typical flight route between the chosen destinations, calculating the exposed population along that route 
and weighting the emission cost based on that population exposure (and possibly their willingness to pay) go 
well beyond the scope of this thesis. Since Sweden is a relatively sparsely populated country, this means the 
results are likely to be on the conservative side.
After calculating the theoretical emissions costs, the level of charges and ETS allowances applied for the 
flights were calculated. For climate impact, this is simply the price of ETS allowances, i.e. approximately 
€ 7/tonne, times the CO2 emissions. Although the majority of the allowances are granted to the airlines for 
free, the price clearly represents an opportunity cost. For the other pollutants, the emission charge for the 
chosen aircraft and engine types departing from Stockholm-Arlanda – the most expensive airport – was 
calculated (Swedavia, 2015). 
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2.3.2  Results
Table 1 External costs, charges/allowance costs, internalisation and uninternalised cost/passenger for three 
typical flights
Arlanda–Gothenburg (SEK/flight)
Cost Charge Internalisation
Climate 11,226 534 5 %
Air quality 2,088 275 13 %
Total 13,313 809 6 %
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.34
Uninternalised cost/passenger 156
Arlanda–Madrid (SEK/flight)
Cost Charge Internalisation
Climate 53,324 1,956 4 %
Air quality 7,088 499 7 %
Total 60,413 2,455 4 %
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.18
Uninternalised cost/passenger 493
Arlanda–Bangkok (SEK/flight)
Cost Charge Internalisation
Climate 608,828 0 0 %
Air quality 91,529 3,360 4 %
Total 700,357 3,360 0,5 %
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.35
Uninternalised cost/passenger 2,914
Table 1 shows the costs, charges and degrees of internalisation for the three flights. More detailed results, 
including figures and assumptions about the flights in questions, are found in appendix A. As was suspected, 
the degree of internalisation is indeed very low, especially for the climate cost. Even with a lower assumed 
climate cost, the degree of internalisation does not exceed 10 per cent in any of the studied cases. Although 
not shown in the appendix, the same can be said about using a lower or even no uplift factor for the high-
altitude climate impact.
The Arlanda–Gothenburg flight is basically the same as the one studied by Hansen & Nerhagen (2008), 
except that they use another engine for the same aircraft for their calculations. Yet, the results here are at the 
same time higher for the air quality costs and a lower for the emission charge. The higher air quality costs are
primarily explained by a generally higher valuation of the unit emissions costs used here compared to the 
older study from Västerås airport on which Hansen & Nerhagen base their calculation, but also by cruise 
emissions of SOX being included in this thesis. The lower emission charge is explained both by a more 
modern engine and by the fact that the previous hydrocarbon part of the emission charge has been removed.
The climate cost found here is higher than SIKA’s (2009). Despite a higher CO2 valuation of SEK 1.50, high-
altitude climate impact is not considered by SIKA, resulting in a lower climate cost.
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Not surprisingly, the results are very similar to the ones found in Trafikanalys (2015b) for the three flights. 
Although they have changed the input values slightly to harmonise better with the methodology used for 
other transport modes, it makes little difference for the resulting costs. The (opportunity) cost of ETS 
allowances is not considered in their main calculation, but an alternative calculation including the ETS price 
results in almost the same uninternalised cost per passenger kilometre as their main result, explained by the 
very low allowance price. 
Comparing the results to the generalised cost/pkm output values of Korzhenevych et al. (2014), the costs 
found here are higher both for climate and air quality. This is not very surprising since their output values 
only consider CO2 and LTO emissions, respectively. Apparently, this effect outweighs the fact that they use 
the EU average as input values for air quality, which are considerably higher than the input values for 
Sweden.
Both climate and air quality are more internalised at shorter distances, but the reason for this is not quite the 
same. For climate, the allowance cost is paid in proportion to the CO2 emissions, but since non-CO2 effects 
make up a larger share of the total climate impact at longer distances, where a larger portion of the flight 
takes place at high altitude, the allowance cost will cover a smaller share of the total climate cost at long 
flights. Obviously, the degree of internalisation is lower – actually zero – outside of the EES where the ETS 
does not apply. For air quality, the emission charge is only paid for LTO emissions, which make up a smaller 
share of the total emissions at longer flights. If instead looking at the total and the uninternalised cost per 
pkm, the cost is actually higher for both short flights (with proportionally high LTO emissions) and very long
flights (with proportionally large high-altitude climate impact), compared to the medium-haul flight.
It is also worth noting that these results apply to one-way trips. For the climate cost, this makes no difference
– either allowances are bought for both directions (within the EEA) or not at all (outside of the EEA) – but 
the emission charge is only paid for flights departing from Swedavia’s airports. If there is no corresponding 
emission charge at the destination airport, or if the charge is lower or higher than Swedavia’s, this will affect 
the results.
The results have also been expressed as the uninternalised cost per passenger. In relation to the Swedish 
government’s plans for a possible tax on aviation, these results give an indication of what order of magnitude
such a tax would have for different distances if it is to internalise the costs that are presently not internalised.
3  The elasticity of demand for air travel
Having established that aviation only pays a fraction of its emissions costs, it is natural to ask how large the 
consequences of this under-internalisation are. If the demand for air travel is price elastic, the consequences 
for the volume of air travel and hence emissions will obviously be larger than if demand is price inelastic. If, 
on the other hand, the observed increase in air travel is mainly driven by an income effect, attempts to price 
this under-internalisation will be less effective. The task of this section is thus to estimate the price and 
income elasticities of air travel, or more specifically, due to the data at hand, of international leisure air travel
from Sweden. 
3.1  Swedish air travel
Figure 2 shows the number of one-way air journeys per capita the last decades, or more precisely the number
of arriving and departing passengers in international traffic and departing passengers in domestic traffic at 
Swedish airports divided by the population of Sweden. Domestic travel has been relatively constant or even 
declining since the 90s, whereas international travel has increased sharply despite dips in response to the 
9/11 attacks and the financial crises: 3.7 per cent/year the last decade. This measure does not reflect changes 
in the average distance travelled; if it did, international air travel would have increased even more in recent 
years (see sub-section 3.2.1). The fact that international travel is both the largest part of total air travel and 
the part that is growing fast makes it especially relevant to focus on this part of Swedish air travel. 
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Figure 2. Number of arriving and departing passengers in international traffic and number of departing passengers in 
domestic traffic at Swedish airports 1974–2013 (Trafikanalys, 2015a) divided by population (source: SCB).
3.2  Data
3.2.1  Household expenditure data
Statistics Sweden (SCB) has collected data on household income and expenditure through interviews and 
collection of receipts among over 2,000 Swedish households. Their data cover the periods 2003–2008 and 
2012 and can be grouped into deciles depending on household income per “consumption unit”, a per capita 
measure differentiating between adults and children in the household (see figure 3, and appendix B for more 
details). 
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Figure 3. Household expenditure on travel abroad (part paid in Sweden) and total household expenditures per 
consumption unit, real prices (source: SCB).
Using household data means that only travel paid by the households, hereafter leisure travel as opposed to 
business travel, can be studied. The data do not distinguish between air travel and other transport modes, but 
there is a category labelled “travel abroad, part paid in Sweden”. Since air travel is the dominant mode for 
travel abroad, representing 67 per cent of leisure travel with overnight stay (Tillväxtverket, 2013), it could be
assumed that this category will correspond well enough to leisure air travel abroad. 
The household expenditures on “travel abroad, part paid in Sweden” was then used to construct a measure of 
the quantity of international air travel for each decile, by dividing the household expenditure per 
consumption unit on this travel, expressed in real terms, with airfares (see sub-section 3.2.2), also in real 
terms. Since the SCB data on airfares are only available up to May 2011, and there is no obvious trend that 
can be used to extrapolate the price, the quantity of travel in 2012 was therefore calculated using the price of 
2011 instead. 
An interesting observation when studying figure 4, which compares the travel measures constructed above 
(averaged across deciles) to the measure previously referred to based on the number of per-capita air 
journeys, is that these new measures increase more steeply than does the number of air journeys alone. 
Apparently the same factors that lead to more journeys demanded also lead to longer journeys demanded. 
This means that if instead using a traditional time series approach relating the number of journeys to average 
airfares and aggregate income/expenditure, although permitting a longer period to be studied, the resulting 
estimates would be biased.
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Figure 4. The index “travel” shows the number of per-capita one-way international air journeys (sources: Trafikanalys 
and SCB), whereas the indices “travel 2” and “travel 3” show the quantity of international air travel constructed from 
household expenditure data described in sub-section 3.2.1 and the price measures described in sub-section 3.2.2.
3.2.2  Price data
International (and domestic) airfares, excluding business fares, are part of SCB’s consumer price index, 
available from 1996 to 2011. They are separated into airfares for scheduled and charter traffic, respectively, 
but the distribution of passengers between these types of flights, provided by Transportstyrelsen, can be used 
to construct an aggregate price index. Still, Transportstyrelsen no longer uses the SCB price index because of
its small sample size and lack of transparency, according to Karyd (2014). Karyd claims that the quality of 
the index has deteriorated with the emergence of low cost airlines with creative charging schemes, which 
have made the collection of reliable price data much more difficult. He concludes that since no functioning 
price measure can be constructed, no price elasticity can be estimated either, and elasticity estimations by 
others should be looked at sceptically. Instead, he suggests that the yield measure in terms of passenger 
revenue per passenger kilometre that most major airlines report could be used as a proxy for price. Since 
there have been no changes in VAT or direct taxation that would drive a wedge between the price paid by the 
consumer and the passenger revenue of the airlines during the studied period, this seems like a plausible 
suggestion.
The largest airline in Sweden is SAS, with 23 per cent of the Swedish market for international air travel 
(Transportstyrelsen, 2015). Although yield measures reported in its annual reports correspond to the whole 
SAS group, i.e. domestic as well as international, business as well as economy class in Sweden, Norway and 
Denmark, and although 77 per cent of the market – including all low cost carriers (LCC) – are not 
represented, it turns out that the SAS yield measure and the SCB price index follow each other closely at 
least up to 2009 (see figure 5, and appendix C for more details). 
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Figure 5. The index “price” shows airfares for international flights from Sweden, scheduled and non-scheduled, real 
prices (sources: SCB and Transportstyrelsen). The index “yield” shows the yield in terms of passenger revenue per 
passenger kilometre for SAS, real prices (source: SAS).
Either their biases are correlated, which could be the case if also the SCB index fails to reflect the airfares of 
LCC, or it seems that both price measures despite their weaknesses still perform fairly well up to 2009. If it 
is the SCB index deteriorating after 2009 or the SAS yield becoming less representative for international 
flights from Sweden after 2009 is hard to tell. The almost constant market share of LCC in the Scandinavian 
market from 2010 and onwards (SAS, 2015) gives no reason to suspect the latter, whereas Karyd’s (2014) 
argument about increasingly complex charging schemes could possibly explain the former. In that case, the 
yield based measure would be more reliable. Still, instead of entirely discarding the SCB index based on 
more or less qualified guesses, both measures were used for separate estimations for comparison.
Bringing it together, figure 6 shows the price data together with the averaged household data. Although the 
variation in average household expenditures and prices is small, the data seem to behave as could be 
expected: increases in the quantity of air travel are generally associated with increases in total expenditure 
and/or decreases in price.
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Figure 6. “Price” shows the SCB price index, “yield” shows the SAS yield measure, “total expenditure” shows the 
average total household expenditure per consumption unit, “travel P” and “travel Y” show the quantity of 
international air travel constructed by dividing the average household expenditure on travel abroad per consumption 
unit by “price” and “yield”, respectively, all prices in real terms (sources: SCB and SAS).
3.3  Model
The following model was used for the estimation of the price and income elasticities of Swedes’ demand for 
international leisure air travel:
ln Qit=ηEln Eit+ηPln Pt+β+εit, 
where Q is the quantity of air travel measured as the annual household expenditure per consumption unit on 
air travel abroad divided by the price of air travel, E is the total annual household expenditure per 
consumption unit, P is the price of international airfares, either measured by the SCB price index or proxied 
by the SAS yield. Hence, ηE is the expenditure elasticity and ηP is the price elasticity of international leisure 
air travel. Furthermore, β is a constant and εit is an error term.
If the aim is to estimate the income elasticity, it would be logical to study the air travel demanded as a 
function of disposable household income per consumption unit. However, household data like these do not 
distinguish between individuals who have above-average incomes over their entire lifetime and individuals 
who are just in a part of their life in which they have above-average incomes. If one is interested in the effect
of a permanent rise in incomes, comparing groups with different current incomes would underestimate the 
long-run income elasticity. Also, even if distributional effects are the main concern, a group that for one 
reason or another can afford larger expenditures than another group – possibly because they have 
accumulated wealth or just temporarily have a lower income – should arguably not be considered poorer just 
because their current incomes are lower. 
Instead, total household expenditure is sometimes used as a proxy for lifetime income (e.g. Poterba, 1991), 
since households can avoid large fluctuations in their expenditure by saving and borrowing when their 
current incomes shift up and down. Thus, total household expenditure normally shows a stronger correlation 
to lifetime income than does current income. The resulting elasticity is then strictly speaking an expenditure 
elasticity and not an income elasticity. In their meta-analysis of income elasticities, Gallet & Doucouliagos 
(2014) find no significant difference for studies that use consumer expenditure as a proxy for income. 
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Therefore, the elasticity estimated here will be referred to as an income elasticity. 
It is in important to note, however, that since household expenditure varies considerably less between deciles
than does income, an elasticity based on current income would have been lower than this one, based on 
expenditure. If one were specifically interested in how individual households respond to changes in current 
incomes, an income-based elasticity estimation would have been more appropriate. If, however, one is more 
interested in how aggregate demand will respond to rising incomes, or how air travel expenditure differs 
between households with different lifetime incomes, an expenditure-based elasticity is more appropriate. 
Since other income elasticity estimations are not usually, if ever, based on household data of different income
groups like these (Gallet & Doucouliagos, 2014), an expenditure-based estimation is more comparable to 
other estimations studying the population in aggregate.
3.4  Results
Table 2. Regression results for the estimations using the SCB price index and SAS yield measure, 
respectively. P-values within parentheses.
SCB SAS
ηE 2.04 (0.000) 2.03 (0.000)
ηP -2.53 (0.000) -1.88 (0.000)
β -9.34 (0.001) -16.23 (0.000)
R2 0.8973  0.9029
Table 2 shows the results of the two estimations based on the SCB price index and the SAS yield, 
respectively, using a pooled OLS regression with robust standard errors. The results are highly significant for
both estimations, while the R2-value is somewhat higher for the estimation based on SAS compared to the 
one based on SCB. It is tempting to conclude that this means that the SAS estimation is therefore better than 
the SCB estimation, because the estimated price elasticity seems more reasonable for SAS than for SCB. 
However, which set of data is most reliable cannot be determined just by looking at which results seem most 
reasonable or have the better fit. Yet, considering the case made in 3.2.2 for the SAS index, there may be 
reasons to trust the SAS results slightly more.
Using OLS in a panel data estimation may seem unorthodox, because fixed or random-effects models are 
often used to control for unobserved heterogeneity between subjects (e.g. Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
Unobserved subject-specific effects are typical when the subjects, or panel units, are e.g. individuals, firms 
or countries, which may all have their own particular time-invariant characteristics which are not accounted 
for by the explanatory variables. If these subject-specific effects are such that error terms and regressors are 
correlated, then OLS estimates will not only be biased but also inconsistent.
For the data at hand, it is less obvious that subject-specific effects should be present. Each decile is 
composed of individuals who vary over years and whose only common characteristic is that they have 
similar household incomes per consumption unit relative to others’. These household incomes are closely 
related to total household expenditure per consumption unit, which is in itself an explanatory variable. In 
fact, differences in household income are not an unobserved heterogeneity; on the contrary there are data on 
this. If one believes that demand for air travel is better modelled as determined by both household 
expenditure and household income than by either of them alone, this could easily be done. Yet, this would be 
even more unorthodox in relation to other studies and imply multicollinearity issues. 
While the model used here only includes household expenditure per consumption unit (and price) as 
explanatory variable, the fact that the grouping is not based on this but on income per consumption unit 
could imply decile-specific effects. In general, higher deciles have both higher incomes and higher 
expenditure, but the first decile is an exception. For most years its members actually have higher 
expenditures than the second decile despite lower incomes. If this complication gives rise to significant 
decile-specific effects, this would call for either a fixed or a random-effects model, depending on the nature 
of these effects.
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To test for fixed effects, the original OLS regression was repeated using decile-specific dummies. An F-test 
was then performed for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of these dummies were all zero. The null 
hypothesis could not be rejected (p-values were 0.2872 and 0.2530 for SCB and SAS, respectively), so a 
fixed-effects model was not deemed appropriate.
To instead test for random effects, a random-effects GLS regression was run and a Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects performed. This could not reject the null hypothesis of no such 
effects (p-values were 0.1982 and 0.1851 for SCB and SAS, respectively), so a random-effects model was 
not deemed appropriate either. 
Even without decile-specific effects, there is still a possibility that there are time-variant, decile-invariant 
effects. This possibility could easily be explained by demand shocks, changing preferences etc. that would 
affect all deciles in a given year equally. Unfortunately, prices also affect all deciles in a given year equally, 
implying multicollinearity. Discarding this model, too, it appears that using pooled OLS would be justified 
after all, as long the heteroscedasticity suggested by figures 7a and 7b and confirmed by a Breusch-Pagan 
heteroscedasticity test is dealt with. The latter was done by using robust standard errors. 
Figure 7a. Actual and predicted travel from the estimation based on the SCB price index.
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Figure 7b. Actual and predicted travel from the estimation based on the SAS yield.
The decent fit of the model seems to justify the chosen approach to model the quantity of air travel as 
determined by airfares and household expenditures alone. This is not to say that there could not be other 
determinants as well. The prices of close substitutes are perhaps the most obvious suspects, but in the case of
international air travel, it is not obvious what these close substitutes would be. While feasible for shorter 
flights, substitutes are scarce for longer flights, so the traveller would not realistically be expected to change 
mode in response to price changes. Also, the relevant consumption choice for leisure travel is not limited to 
choosing among different transport modes to a chosen destination. Rather, consumers may choose among 
different destinations, or decide to trade holiday trips for other consumption which gives them more utility 
given their budget constraint. Since these alternatives could be basically anything, not including any cross-
price elasticities in the model could be justified. Whereas including the price and expenditure of non-fare 
components of the journey, as suggested by Njegovan (2006), would have been relevant because of their 
considerable share of the total expenditure on the journey, lack of data on the prices of these components 
rendered that approach impossible.
There could of course be other forces at work, too, like changes in preferences, globalisation etc., but they 
are notoriously hard to capture. What could be seen from figure 2, however, is that the studied period, 2003–
2008 and 2012, seems to be free of major shocks like the ones following the 9/11 attacks and the recent 
financial crisis. Also, a Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables was performed, which did not indicate 
omitted variables. Still, considering the difficulty to control for time-variant effects, it cannot be ruled out 
that there are other factors contributing to the increase in air travel not captured in the model. If there is in 
fact omitted variable bias involved, that could be one explanation why the estimated elasticities are so high.
Another explanation could be that the data are flawed. Unfortunately, there are weaknesses in both the 
household expenditure and the price data. If the household expenditure category “travel abroad, part paid in 
Sweden”, or more specifically changes in that category between years and deciles, corresponds well enough 
to international leisure air travel, then the data will provide a sound basis for estimation. However, there are 
at least two reasons why this might not be the case. 
The first reason is that the share of air travel might not be evenly distributed between income deciles. For 
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example, car travel (the second largest mode at 17 per cent) is perhaps not only over-represented at shorter 
distances but possibly also in lower income groups, in comparison to air travel. This would then tend to 
underestimate the income effect.
The second reason is that since charter flights make up one third of the outbound leisure air journeys, the 
“part paid in Sweden”1 expenditure will in many cases include not only airfare but also accommodation etc., 
which would otherwise be a part of the category “travel abroad, part paid abroad”. If there are systematic 
differences between deciles or years, e.g. if charter flights make up a larger share of the total travel share in 
some income groups, this will be a problem. 
There are no data showing the distribution of charter flights between different income groups, but it could be 
suspected that they are over-represented in lower income groups. Yet, there are data from Transportstyrelsen2
on the distribution of passengers in scheduled and charter flights between different years, showing that 
charter traffic has remained more or less constant for the relevant period (i.e. 2003–2012), whereas scheduled
traffic has almost doubled. This means that the non-fare share of “travel abroad, part paid in Sweden” should 
have declined over the years, which would partly mask the real increase in air travel. Both these tendencies 
described would tend to underestimate the responsiveness of air travel expenditure.
As for the price data, they only comprise seven years, which is a very small basis for estimation, and their 
weaknesses have already been described in sub-section 3.2.2. Specifically, if the price indices do not reliably 
represent the effect of an increasing LCC market share on prices, and so understate the decrease in average 
prices during the studied period, then the estimated price elasticity will be exaggerated. In addition, as noted 
already in the introduction, using household expenditure panel data enables reliable estimates of the income 
elasticity, whereas the price elasticity will still be subject to possible distortions from failing to include 
relative price changes and other aspects that change in the economy over the years, and will so be more of a 
residual.
Considering these weaknesses in the data, it may not come as a surprise that the results presented here depart
from the results of previous studies. A price elasticity of -2.53 or -1.88 is much higher (in absolute values) 
than the previously cited estimates (Brons et al., 2002; Njegovan, 2006; Chi & Baek, 2012; Kopsch, 2012a). 
Since this thesis focuses on leisure travel, which according to Brons et al. is the market segment with the 
highest elasticity, a higher estimate than their aggregate mean of -1.146 should be expected. On the other 
hand, the price elasticities found in this thesis would most likely be considered short-run following the 
categorisation of Brons et al. They find that these will generally be lower than long-run elasticities, as the 
ones used by Chi & Baek (-1.56 for aggregate air travel) and Kopsch for his long-run estimation (-1.20 for 
domestic leisure air travel, while his short-run estimate is only -0.79). 
The fact that Kopsch studies Swedish air travel makes his study especially interesting from a Swedish 
perspective, but also means that some of the problems pertaining to the Swedish data will be present in his 
study as well. Although he also depends on price data from SCB, his time series is much longer, spanning 
from 1980 to 2007, which means the current problems related to LCC charging schemes might not be very 
prominent. A more serious objection is that Kopsch uses the number of passengers as his measure of the 
quantity of air travel. As seen in figure 4, this is likely to underestimate changes in the quantity of air travel 
since changes in the distance travelled are not accounted for, and so the resulting price elasticity will be too 
low. 
Njegovan’s study has a similar focus to this thesis, namely outbound leisure travel – in his case from the UK 
– which means the results should be comparable. However, in addition to the prices of the actual travel, his 
model includes the prices of on non-fare components of the journey, which are clearly relevant for the 
consumers’ travel choices, and so he ends up with a much lower price elasticity of only -0.7. This approach is
attractive from a theoretical point of view, but is not commonly used, most likely because of the challenging 
data requirements. Therefore, his results are not directly comparable to the ones found here or previously 
cited.
In conclusion, the above reasoning suggests that Swedes’ demand for international leisure air travel should in
fact be price elastic, but values of -1.88 and especially -2.53 are still very surprising. Given the serious data 
1 Technically the questionnaire asks for the portion of the total expenditure on travel abroad that is paid to recipients in Sweden, i.e. paying 
accommodation etc. over the internet while at home in Sweden is instead part of the category “travel abroad, part paid abroad”.
2 Unpublished material.
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limitations – a very small sample using two unreliable price indices which possibly overestimate the price 
elasticity – and a model that is actually more accurate in estimating the income elasticity, it is not 
recommended to draw any far-reaching conclusions from these results. However, they do support the results 
of other studies that show that the demand for international air travel is price elastic.
Turning to the income elasticity, the results seem more reasonable. An income elasticity of 2.03 or 2.04 is 
higher than the income elasticity from Gallet’s & Doucouliagos’ (2014) meta-analysis of 1.546 for 
international air travel, but the difference is not unreasonably large. Kopsch’s (2012a) GDP coefficient for 
Swedish domestic flights is only 0.44, but using household expenditure panel data is arguably a more reliable
way to estimate income elasticities than using a GDP coefficient in an estimation of price elasticity. In 
addition, the income elasticity should be higher for international than for domestic travel according to Gallet 
& Doucouliagos, so the large distance to Kopsch’s estimation should not be too discouraging.
If instead looking at Graham’s (2000) estimate for international leisure travel of 1.89 for the period 1984-
1998, the results are actually relatively well in line. However, her declining trend suggests that the income 
elasticity should be lower today, especially since Sweden has among the highest travel propensities in 
Europe in terms of international trips (Graham, 2006), which would imply a larger market maturity. 
Gallet & Doucouliagos predict that estimates from time series data will generally by higher than those from 
panel data, but the panel data they refer to are not of the household expenditure by income group type used 
here, and so the prediction is not necessarily valid in this case. Finally, the very high income elasticity of 
3.74 found by Chi & Baek (2012) shows that the results found here are not extreme. 
Although the data have several limitations, if anything it appears they would tend to underestimate the 
income elasticity. Also, while the short time span studied applies equally to price and household expenditure,
at least the latter have ten observations each year. Therefore, despite data weaknesses, it may well be the case
that the income elasticity of Swedes’ demand for international air travel is indeed very high.
4  Pricing uninternalised emissions costs
This section ties together the results from sections 2 and 3. First, different ways of pricing the currently 
uninternalised emissions cost by changing existing or introducing new economic instruments for aviation are
discussed. Then, the consequences of such instruments on the demand for air travel are sketched.
4.1  Designing economic instruments for aviation
Standard economic theory (e.g. Perman et al., 2009) suggests that the most cost-effective way to internalise 
external emissions costs is to price the emissions directly. Since the amount of CO2 emitted is perfectly 
related to fuel use, a fuel tax would work just as fine theoretically and be easier to handle practically. 
Unfortunately, there is no prospect of a global CO2 tax in the foreseeable future, and countries cannot 
unilaterally impose taxes on jet fuel. 
This prohibition is often blamed on the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation from 1944, but 
as Åkerman (2013) explains, the wording of the convention only prohibits taxation of fuel already on board 
an aircraft on arrival in another state. However, most bilateral air service agreements that regulate 
international air traffic, including the EU/US Open skies agreement, prohibit fuel taxation, as does the EU 
energy taxation directive 2003/96/EC. Therefore, countries taxing aviation – at least a few in Europe – do so 
by some sort of passenger tax levied on airfares. Most of them are differentiated based on distance, and in the
British case a distinction is also made between different fare classes. According to Åkerman, the UK planned
to change its per passenger tax to a weight-based per plane tax in order to increase the correlation between 
tax and emissions, but abandoned the plans because it was feared a weight-based tax would be illegal under 
international law. 
The commitment of the ICAO to work out a proposal for a global market-based measure scheme capable of 
being implemented by 2020 gives some hope, but given the fierce protests from several ICAO member states
to the EU ETS, it would be surprising if the ICAO would implement a radical scheme.
Strengthening the price signal of the EU ETS, e.g. by reducing the number of allowances or introducing 
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some sort of price floor, is another option under debate. The European Commission has put forward a 
number of suggestions, but the only measure that has been implemented so far is the “back-loading”, or 
postponement, of a number of allowances. Given the difficulties to pass even that proposal, a radical reform 
of the ETS seems unlikely at the moment.
If Swedish politicians do not want to wait for international consensus but want to lead by example – hoping 
this will pave the way for more ambitious international measures – the option left is basically some sort of 
passenger tax like the ones already in use in some European countries, and possibly raising the VAT rate to 
the standard rate. Although such a tax gives no incentive for technological abatement measures, it does give 
an incentive to fly less, both in terms of frequency and distance (as long as it varies with flight distance). 
Incentives to fly less may actually prove more important than technological and operational measures. 
Several authors (e.g. Lee et al., 2010; Karyd, 2013; Larsson et al., 2015) are sceptical to the potential for 
biofuels in aircraft in the foreseeable future. The special demands on jet fuel make it cheaper, both in 
economic and energy terms, to use the limited available biomass in other applications. Moreover, in the 
scenarios of future climate impact from aviation produced by Larsson et al. (2015), even the most optimistic 
scenario only exhibits an annual decrease of emissions per passenger kilometre of 1.7 per cent. Of all their 
scenarios, only those in which the volume of air travel is frozen at current levels are compatible with the 
target of stabilising global warming below 2ºC. Thus, there seems to be a case for passenger taxes even if 
they do not lead to any technological improvements but only reduce demand compared to business as usual. 
Technological improvements could then be promoted by other instruments like emission standards, best 
available technology requirements, R&D investments etc.
An interesting question is whether a tax on the non-CO2 climate impact of aviation, differentiated for time, 
flight route and other aspects that affect ozone production, contrail formation etc., would meet any legal 
obstacles. Since these effects are only vaguely correlated to fuel use, a layman might conclude that they are 
not fuel taxes and should thus be legal. On the other hand, the UK had to stop its planned weight-based per-
plane tax because of its close correlation to fuel taxes, so the legal aspects need further consideration. If 
deemed legal, a tax based on the actual or, for practical reasons, estimated non-CO2 climate impact would 
give better incentives for technological and operational measures like changing flight altitude than including 
the non-CO2 climate impacts in a passenger tax or through a simple uplift factor for aviation in the ETS (i.e. 
requiring more than one permit per tonne CO2 for aviation specifically).
A similar point can be made for air quality. Apparently the existing emission charge is not considered a fuel 
tax, so expanding the charge to cover all air quality relevant pollutants during take-off and landing should not
pose any legal constraints. If including cruise emissions, which show some correlation to fuel use, the 
legality must first be examined. If it is possible to charge actual emissions in all flight phases, the charge 
would give airlines an incentive to introduce cleaner technologies, while the low air quality cost compared to
the climate cost means that the effect on demand would not be quite as dramatic. 
Also, part of the charge could be differentiated according to the number of people in the vicinity of the 
airport, so that measures for reducing emissions with mainly local impact are prioritised at airports where 
these pollutants cause the largest damage. The current differentiation based on whether the airport is state-
owned or not is not an ideal proxy for population exposure. On the other hand, if the charge is to be applied 
at private and municipal airports, it might be considered a tax. In that case, its compliance with international 
law must first be examined.
While the low allowance price in the EU ETS means the scheme is insufficient to internalise the climate cost 
of aviation, the fact that emissions are capped under this scheme means that complementary price 
instruments, although theoretically contributing to internalising externalities, might not contribute to any real
emission cuts. In a well-functioning emissions trading system, the total amount of emissions is set by the 
total allowance cap, so increasing emission reductions in one sector or country means that emissions can 
increase correspondingly somewhere else. In that case, complementary measures for sectors covered by the 
scheme are meaningless, and the only way forward is the long way to get all member states to agree on 
lowering the cap.
Given the large current surplus of allowances in the ETS, it seems unlikely that any additional reductions 
would be completely offset by increased emissions elsewhere in the system. More likely, at least part of the 
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reductions would end up increasing the allowance surplus rather than increasing current emissions. Although 
increasing the allowance surplus means that more can be emitted later, thus postponing rather than 
decreasing emissions, the future cap of the scheme is not likely to be independent of the way the surplus 
evolves. Rather, a larger surplus and a lower allowance price would make measures to tighten the cap more 
politically feasible. Therefore, in a dynamic perspective, there is a case for complementary measures to 
decrease or at least halt the increase of aviation emissions.
This argument is further strengthened by the fact that the ETS only covers CO2, while the total climate 
impact of aviation includes non-CO2 effects as well. This means that for every allowance transferred from 
stationary sources to aviation, the cap effectively expands when the climate impact from one tonne of CO2 is 
traded for a climate impact that could be twice as large. Thus, measures that reduce aviation’s net purchase of
allowances from other industries effectively reduce total climate impact.
4.2  Effects of internalising the emissions costs of aviation
If the demand for air travel is indeed price elastic, this means that the under-internalisation of the emissions 
costs of aviation is not only of matter of who pays for the environmental damage, but also leads to emissions 
levels that are too high compared to what would be socially desirable. Correspondingly, correcting for the 
low degree of internalisation through a tax on aviation or some other price instrument would clearly reduce 
the demand for air travel.
To quantify the effect on air travel demand from internalising the full emissions costs, one would need the 
average percentage price increase from internalisation, which requires both information on the uninternalised
costs to all possible destinations along with the corresponding prices. Clearly, this is an overwhelming task, 
and considering the limitations of the estimated price elasticities, the results would in any case be very 
inexact. Also, some of the cost increase could fall on the owners of the airline rather than on its customers, 
adding further inexactness to the calculations. Probably a less exact approximation would serve well enough 
to give some sense of the orders of magnitude. 
Unfortunately the SCB price index is not expressed in actual prices comparable to the calculated emissions 
costs, but the SAS yield is expressed as passenger revenue/passenger kilometre (pkm). This measure, which 
is SEK 0.94 for 2014, can then be compared to the uninternalised costs/pkm, yielding the percentage price 
increase if the SAS yield were representative for the airfares of the studied flights and if the price were to 
increase by exactly the uninternalised cost. Certainly, the yield is not the same for all studied flights, but on 
the other hand, airlines are not likely to distribute the increased costs evenly. Rather, there would be a greater
margin to raise airfares for routes with high yields than for routes with lower yields, signalling tougher 
competition. More generally, airlines would distribute the price increase unevenly among customers with 
different price elasticities, e.g. raising business class fares more than economy class fares. This means that 
although business travellers according to other studies are less price sensitive, the actual airfare increase 
could in practice be such that business travel decreases as much as leisure travel. 
The price increase for the typical flights calculated above spans from 19 per cent to 37 per cent, with the 
medium haul in the lower and the domestic and long haul in the upper end of the range. While the SAS yield 
may be adequate enough to reflect price changes, as used in the estimation of price elasticity, it is probably 
less adequate in reflecting absolute price levels, as used here to determine the price increase from 
internalising the uninternalised emissions costs. As a comparison, the yield of Norwegian, the main LCC in 
the Swedish market with a market share of 14.9 per cent (Transportstyrelsen, 2015), can be used. 
Norwegian’s yield in 2014 was NOK 0.43/km (Norwegian, 2015) or SEK 0.50/km, which would imply a 
price increase in the range of 36–70 per cent if the uninternalised costs were the same. To be exact, LCC 
could use other aircraft and fly from airports with no emission charge, but since the air quality cost is low 
compared to the climate cost, this would not make a great difference. Also, although LCC do not normally 
offer intercontinental flights, holiday trips to distant destinations are frequently offered as charters, where 
airfares can be lower than those of full-price scheduled flights.
Although the exact way that airlines would distribute the price increases between its customers cannot be 
known beforehand, it seems that the proportional rise in airfares would in any case differ between airlines in 
different price segments. With a LCC share of 35 per cent in the Scandinavian market (SAS, 2015) and a 
charter share of one third of the outbound leisure air journeys (Tillväxtverket, 2013), the average price 
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increase would be somewhere between the extremes above. For illustrational purposes, let us assume an 
average increase in international airfares of 50 per cent. If the price elasticity were indeed as high as -2, and 
not only in the price range used in the estimation, then taxing the full emissions costs of aviation would 
decrease travel by 56 per cent. 
Using elasticities calculated for marginal changes (based on possibly flawed data) to predict the effects of 
more drastic price changes (based on rough approximations) implies that this back-of-the-envelope 
calculation should not be interpreted literally. What could be concluded, though, is that a tax on aviation 
would most likely have a clear effect on the demand for aviation and thus on emissions. The argument that 
an aviation tax would just make people pay more for their holidays without affecting the environment can 
thus be refuted. 
What could be a risk, however, is that people avoid the tax by flying from airports of neighbouring countries 
instead. Especially for people in the south of Sweden, close to the large international airport of Copenhagen, 
this could be an attractive option even at low tax levels. For people with a larger distance to the closest non-
taxed airport, tax levels must be higher to compensate for the cost, including time cost, to reach that airport 
by other transport modes. In terms on emissions, this may still lead to a small reduction in emissions if 
people change part of their journey from airplanes to trains or tightly packed cars, but it could also lead to 
people flying more or less the same distance but adding a longer car journey to that. However, unless people 
start taking very long detours, it seems that although such evasive measures could definitely decrease the 
environmental effectiveness of taxing aviation, it seems unlikely that it would turn the expected 
environmental gains into losses.
The result that richer households spend a larger share of their total expenditure on international air travel 
should refute the argument that such a tax would hit poor people the hardest, and that the rich would fly just 
as much as before. Actually, Brons et al. (2002) find a negative correlation between GDP and price elasticity 
(expressed as a negative number), implying that travellers with a higher income tend to be more price 
sensitive than travellers with a lower income.
Elasticities of domestic air travel are not studied in this thesis, but the results from Kopsch (2012a) suggest 
that an aviation tax could be regressive for domestic air travel. However, an income elasticity derived from a 
GDP coefficient in a demand estimation arguably says less about the distributional effects than an income 
elasticity derived from household data, and in any case the absolute price change from internalising the 
emissions costs of domestic air travel is much lower than for international travel. In addition, international 
flights make up the majority of total flights, so the overall effect of an aviation tax would be progressive. As 
for the price elasticity, Kopsch’s domestic demand is also elastic at least in the long run, so it seems an 
aviation tax would have a clear environmental effect for domestic travel as well, although the lower 
uninternalised cost means that effect would still not be very dramatic.
5  Conclusion
The results of this thesis show that aviation indeed pays a very low fraction of its emissions costs. The 
climate cost is internalised to 4–5 per cent for typical flights within the EU and 0 per cent for flights to 
destinations outside of the EU, where the ETS does not apply. For air quality, the degree of internalisation 
spans from 4 per cent for a typical long-haul flight to 13 per cent for a typical domestic flight. In total then, 
the degree of internalisation of emissions costs spans from practically zero for a long-haul flight to 6 per cent
for a domestic flight. 
If the emissions costs currently not paid for by the airlines would be internalised by means of taxation or 
other price instruments, the effective tax per passenger for the three typical flights studied would be SEK 156
for Arlanda–Gothenburg, SEK 493 for Arlanda–Madrid and SEK 2,914 for Arlanda–Bangkok. Such a price 
increase would have a dramatic effect on the demand for long-distance flights. The price elasticity of 
Swedes’ demand for international leisure air travel was estimated to -1.88 or -2.53 depending on the price 
measure used. Although these surprisingly high elasticities should be interpreted very cautiously due to data 
limitations, the results support other findings that demand for leisure travel is price elastic, if not quite as 
elastic as was found here. Also, the high income elasticity estimated here – 2.03 or 2.04 –  highlights that 
increasing incomes will in itself increase the demand for international air travel. Therefore, price instruments
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at symbolic levels would not be enough to compensate for the demand increase from rising incomes.
Although the main challenge when tackling the emissions of aviation is not lack of scientific knowledge but 
rather of political courage, there are certainly areas for future research. Since the emissions cost of aviation 
depends heavily on the valuation of climate impacts, narrowing the range of cost estimations would give a 
clearer picture of the total emissions cost. On the other hand, the problem is not primarily caused by a lack of
economic valuation studies, but rather by the inherent uncertainty of the consequences of climate change.
Air quality, on the other hand, is an area where more economic valuation studies would certainly be useful. 
Although representing a lower cost than climate change, the non-uniform dispersion properties of air quality 
pollutants means that valuation studies must account for the dispersion patterns of the pollutants and the 
exposed population at different sources. While damage costs are expressed as average values, actual damage 
costs will vary between, say, Bromma airport with a large population in its vicinity and other airports in less 
populated areas. If these differences were better understood, the emission charge could be geographically 
differentiated to reflect the differences in population exposure. This is perhaps of less interest for 
international flights, where the local effects make up a very small share of the air quality costs, but could be 
more interesting for domestic flights, which also concern a wider range of airports.
When evaluating the consequences of price instruments that internalise the emissions costs not currently paid
for by the airlines, more robust estimations of the price and income elasticities of the demand for air travel 
are needed. This would require better data, such as a more reliable price index, ideally expressed in units that
are comparable to the uninternalised costs, and a longer time series of household expenditure data, where air 
travel would have its own category. If instead estimating elasticities from price data and some aggregate 
income measure, so that business as well as leisure travel can be studied, a measure of the quantity of air 
travel that reflects the average distance and not only the number of journeys would be helpful. 
For the time being, though, the exact effects of completely internalising the emissions costs of aviation seem 
to be of more academic than practical interest. Unless political preferences change rapidly, it seems unlikely 
that any Swedish government would dare to propose an aviation tax of SEK 3,000 for a one-way trip to 
Thailand in the immediate future. Given the fierce debates spurred by proposed taxes at levels one tenth of 
this, it seems likely that if a tax on aviation would be introduced in Sweden, its initial level would not be 
very close to the level suggested by the results of this thesis for longer trips. Thus, economists would still 
have time to improve the accuracy of the above estimations while trying to increase public acceptance of 
internalising the full external costs of aviation, in Sweden as well as internationally, and while cooperating 
with legal expertise to find the best possible designs of these price instruments under current legal 
constraints.
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7  Appendix
7.1  Appendix A
Air pollution from typical flights
Inflation 2010-2015 1.0465
Exchange rate kr/€ 10
Allowance price €/tonne 7
Short haul, Arlanda–Gothenburg
Aircraft Boeing 737-600
Engine  CFM56-7B20/3
Number of seats 123
Load factor 65%
Great circle distance km 394
Correction factor km 50
Flight distance km 444
EMEP/EEA distance km 463
Emission charge 275
Allowance cost 534
NOX SOX NMVOC PM2.5 Σ pollutants CO2 CO2 low CO2 high
LTO emissions kg 7.65896 0.605737 0.91 0.04914 2,271.516 2,271.516 2,271.516
LTO cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0.974 14.578 0.109 0.058 0.203
LTO cost € 40.2 3.3 0.9 0.7 45.1 247.6 131.7 461.1
Cruise emissions kg 27.97276 1.42705 0.185387 5,351.431 5,351.431 5,351.431
Cruise cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0 0 0.1635 0.087 0.3045
Cruise cost € 146.8 7.7 0 0 154.5 875.0 465.6 1,629.5
Total cost € 2010 187.0 11.0 0.9 0.7 199.5
Tot cost € 2015 195.7 11.5 0.9 0.7 208.8 1,122.6 597.3 2,090.6
Total cost SEK 2015 1,957 115 9 7 2,088 11,226 5,973 20,906
Total cost/passenger SEK 20 1 0 0 26 140 75 261
Total cost/pkm SEK 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.16 0.56
Internalisation 13% 5% 9% 3%
Uninternalised cost/passenger 23 134 68 255
Tot uninternalised cost/passenger 156 91 277
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.34 0.20 0.60
Medium haul, Arlanda–Madrid
Aircraft Airbus A320
Engine V2527-A5
Number of seats 168
Load factor 70%
Great circle distance km 2,597
Correction factor km 100
Flight distance km 2,697
EMEP/EEA distance km 2,778
Emission charge 499
Allowance cost 1,956
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NOX SOX NMVOC PM2.5 Σ pollutants CO2 CO2 low CO2 high
LTO emissions kg 10.76448 0.733532 0.51 0.120588 2,750.744 2,751.744 2,752.744
LTO cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0.974 14.578 0.109 0.058 0.203
LTO cost € 56.5 4.0 0.5 1.8 62.7 299.8 159.6 558.8
Cruise emissions kg 110.2454 6.715665 1.994820 25,183.70 25,184.70 25,185.70
Cruise cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0 0 0.200 0.106 0.372
Cruise cost € 578.5 36.2 0 0 614.6 5,032.6 2,678.0 9,373.4
Total cost € 2010 634.9 40.1 0.5 1.8 677.3
Tot cost € 2015 664.5 42.0 0.5 1.8 708.8 5,332.4 2,837.6 9,932.2
Total cost SEK 2015 6,645 420 5 18 7,088 53,324 28,376 99,322
Total cost/passenger SEK 49 3 0 0 60 453 241 845
Total cost/pkm SEK 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.09 0.30
Internalisation 7% 4% 7% 2%
Uninternalised cost/passenger 56 437 225 828
Tot uninternalised cost/passenger 493 281 884
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.18 0.10 0.32
Long haul, Arlanda–Bangkok
Aircraft Boeing 777-300
Engine GE90-115B
Number of seats 299
Load factor 80%
Great circle distance km 8,290
Correction factor km 125
Flight distance km 8,415
EMEP/EEA distance km 8,334
Emission charge 3,360
NOX SOX NMVOC PM2.5 Σ pollutants CO2 CO2 low CO2 high
LTO emissions kg 63.25719 2.02346 0.59 0.145644 7,587.972 7,588.972 7,589.972
LTO cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0.974 14.578 0.109 0.058 0.203
LTO cost € 331.9 10.9 0.6 2.1 345.5 827.1 440.2 1,540.8
Cruise emissions kg 1,540.68 58.76836 7.372216 22,0380.8 22,0381.8 22,0382.8
Cruise cost €/kg 5.247 5.389 0 0 0.273 0.145 0.508
Cruise cost € 8,084.0 316.7 0 0 8,400.7 60,055.7 31,956.4 111,847.8
Total cost € 2010 8,415.9 327.6 0.6 2.1 8,746.2
Tot cost € 2015 8,807.2 342.8 0.6 2.2 9,152.9 60,882.8 32,396.5 113,388.6
Total cost SEK 2015 88,072 3,428 6 22 91,529 608,828 323,965 1,133,886
Total cost/passenger SEK 368 14 0 0 383 2,545 1,354 4,740
Total cost/pkm SEK 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.16 0.57
Internalisation 4% 0% 0% 0%
Uninternalised cost/passenger 369 2,545 1,354 4,740
Tot uninternalised cost/passenger 2,914 1,723 5,109
Uninternalised cost/pkm 0.35 0.21 0.61
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7.2  Appendix B
Household expenditure data from SCB, with consumer price index as comparison, also from SCB. “Travel 
expenditure” refers to expenditure on “travel abroad, part paid in Sweden”. Deciles are grouped according to 
household income per consumption unit.
Income decile Year Household income Total expenditure Travel expenditure Consumption units Consumer price index
1 2003 112,930 160,560 2,180 1.62 278.10
1 2004 113,510 177,050 4,040 1.61 279.20
1 2005 97,470 199,760 3,310 1.45 280.40
1 2006 99,790 167,080 2,540 1.44 284.22
1 2007 106,690 180,760 2,860 1.51 290.51
1 2008 114,430 178,210 2,730 1.54 300.61
1 2012 102,950 217,450 4,360 1.50 314.20
2 2003 162,570 168,850 1,430 1.62 278.10
2 2004 170,450 172,450 2,100 1.65 279.20
2 2005 163,370 179,770 2,770 1.53 280.40
2 2006 164,530 179,050 1,750 1.55 284.22
2 2007 164,800 176,550 2,620 1.46 290.51
2 2008 172,800 177,270 1,910 1.43 300.61
2 2012 181,310 194,810 3,970 1.45 314.20
3 2003 193,330 194,900 1,210 1.65 278.10
3 2004 196,380 193,470 2,680 1.65 279.20
3 2005 196,960 201,920 2,380 1.57 280.40
3 2006 190,480 202,100 2,990 1.52 284.22
3 2007 202,170 197,530 2,950 1.50 290.51
3 2008 216,750 215,810 3,240 1.54 300.61
3 2012 214,090 219,350 4,440 1.42 314.20
4 2003 217,100 210,600 2,780 1.64 278.10
4 2004 214,650 217,450 3,080 1.61 279.20
4 2005 230,440 224,760 3,050 1.63 280.40
4 2006 233,890 223,400 3,010 1.64 284.22
4 2007 250,150 226,740 4,670 1.62 290.51
4 2008 273,230 266,500 5,250 1.69 300.61
4 2012 274,550 242,920 4,760 1.57 314.20
5 2003 252,470 239,430 3,600 1.72 278.10
5 2004 257,490 240,950 3,340 1.74 279.20
5 2005 266,490 251,880 4,280 1.69 280.40
5 2006 272,720 280,630 5,880 1.72 284.22
5 2007 303,700 268,460 5,560 1.73 290.51
5 2008 299,090 272,130 6,390 1.64 300.61
5 2012 333,570 287,450 4,260 1.65 314.20
6 2003 260,740 247,770 3,800 1.61 278.10
6 2004 265,960 235,930 4,410 1.62 279.20
6 2005 288,270 259,980 4,900 1.63 280.40
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6 2006 283,390 268,150 4,550 1.60 284.22
6 2007 322,570 265,160 6,560 1.64 290.51
6 2008 333,160 296,540 5,550 1.63 300.61
6 2012 384,340 327,680 6,530 1.68 314.20
7 2003 296,420 270,520 4,300 1.65 278.10
7 2004 302,620 271,790 4,240 1.66 279.20
7 2005 310,850 286,500 6,010 1.58 280.40
7 2006 324,900 285,900 6,050 1.66 284.22
7 2007 352,700 292,860 6,310 1.59 290.51
7 2008 391,410 316,910 8,230 1.70 300.61
7 2012 417,370 339,710 9,230 1.62 314.20
8 2003 307,510 266,270 4,490 1.52 278.10
8 2004 339,140 283,120 6,480 1.65 279.20
8 2005 359,880 305,560 6,470 1.62 280.40
8 2006 349,290 312,260 7,410 1.60 284.22
8 2007 401,620 316,870 8,110 1.58 290.51
8 2008 396,200 333,820 8,980 1.51 300.61
8 2012 482,080 372,990 13,220 1.64 314.20
9 2003 361,560 316,520 6,430 1.57 278.10
9 2004 363,670 319,010 7,790 1.53 279.20
9 2005 399,140 333,640 8,870 1.53 280.40
9 2006 383,760 308,580 7,390 1.52 284.22
9 2007 448,170 343,790 9,610 1.50 290.51
9 2008 480,390 364,430 10,270 1.56 300.61
9 2012 548,610 397,510 13,780 1.61 314.20
10 2003 523,260 376,890 9,480 1.57 278.10
10 2004 550,630 349,840 8,180 1.49 279.20
10 2005 562,180 403,310 13,020 1.50 280.40
10 2006 617,760 410,950 13,640 1.55 284.22
10 2007 782,320 385,600 12,190 1.50 290.51
10 2008 816,240 497,960 18,690 1.51 300.61
10 2012 808,980 481,640 16,680 1.54 314.20
7.3  Appendix C
SCB price index in real terms, SAS yield in nominal terms and SCB consumer price index.
Year SCB price SAS yield Consumer price index
2003 107.43 1.27 278.10
2004 96.34 1.11 279.20
2005 92.87 1.10 280.40
2006 94.89 1.12 284.22
2007 98.78 1.25 290.51
2008 98.30 1.27 300.61
2012 95.14 1.09 314.20
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